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Introduction 
GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY PLAYS two con-
flicting roles in livestock disease control. The posi-
tive side is that it gives producers an incentive to 
report. In this regard, empirical studies have shown 
that the supply of scrapie-infected sheep changes 
with different levels of indemnity payment (Kuchler 
and Hamm, 2000). Early disclosure of disease is 
vital in disease control and eradication, as reflected 
by shorter disease duration and reduced total loss. 
On the other hand, government indemnity may 
induce producers to curtail their biosecurity input 
as a result of reduced loss from disease 
(Muhammad and Jones, 2008). 
As a result, careful thought is required to properly 
design any government indemnity scheme seeking 
to control a livestock disease. Previous literature 
has generally assumed away the third party exter-
nality effects of livestock disease. However, consid-
ering contagious diseases such as Bovine TB, the 
output of one farm depends not only on its own bi-
osecurity effort, but crucially on the measures 
taken by adjacent farmers as well. Poorly main-
tained fences and common use of water or other 
resources can lead to infection by neighboring 
herds. See Table 1 for examples of exotic and en-
demic animal diseases in the U.S., and relevant bi-
osecurity measures to be taken. Even low conta-
gion diseases (e.g., bovine spongiform encepha-
lopathy) generate externality problems in that they 
may cause major losses for producers of non-
infected livestock through price impacts when very 
few animals are affected. This is a major issue for 
those seeking to rid a region of a disease. 
Analysis
Conclusion
BIOSECURITY EFFORTS PLAY a fundamental 
role in livestock disease control. If managed im-
properly, there might be widespread economic 
losses. This study takes into account the individual 
producer’s incentive to use the biosecurity inputs 
in an environment where third party externalities 
exist. We suggest that the indemnity level should 
not to be set uniformly as the fair market value but 
should be conditioned on the nature of the disease 
and the other herds’ disease status as well. 
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indemnity scheme of this form will improve the wel-
fare of the government and all farmers, compared 
with an indemnity contract that ignores these ef-
fects. Pareto improvement is achieved due to im-
proved risk sharing (Hölmstrom, 1979). 
We find that if the disease is exotic and all the farms 
are disease susceptible, then the current govern-
ment indemnification practice is optimal, i.e., the in-
demnity level should be based on the fair market 
value. Suppose, on the other hand, that a disease is 
endemic, and it is known that producer A has the 
disease-harboring herd while producer B’s herd is 
disease susceptible. Then, all else equal, optimal bi-
osecurity inputs for producer A will be higher than is 
the case for producer B. To provide farm A with an 
incentive to biosecure optimally, its indemnity level 
should be less than the fair market value. 
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pen ASAP to reduce
the risk of ingestion
of JD bacteria;
determine the JD
status of the herd
for replacements 
Table 1. Examples  of exotic and endemic animal diseases
in the United States 
Figure 1. Scheme of the Model 
SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS UNDER which a sepa-
rate indemnity contract between the government and 
a farmer will be optimal are identified. It requires that 
no externalities, as discussed, exist among producers. 
Figures 2a and 2b depict the cases in which a sepa-
rate contract for farmer 1 or 2 is optimal, while Figure 
2c shows the case in which separate contracts are op-
timal for both farmers. In other cases optimal indem-
nity contract that takes externality effects into ac-
count requires one producer’s indemnity to be a de-
creasing function of the other producer’s output. An 
Figure 2a. Separate contract for farmer 1 is optimal
Figure 2b. Separate contract for farmer 2 is optimal













Optimal Biosecurity Measure Speciﬁed 
Indemnity Plan Made by Government 
Biosecurity Measure Taken by Farmers
Indemnity Provided to Farmers 
Disease Status Revealed 






WE  PRESENT A ONE-PRINCIPAL, two-agent model 
in the manner of Mookherjee (1984), where the principal 
stands for the government and the agents stand for two 
producers whose livestock face a probability of 
contracting a certain contagious disease. 
A diagrammatic explanation of the model scheme can 
be found in Figure 1. Here the possible livestock output 
of each producer is jointly determined by the 
biosecurity inputs of both producers as well as the 
ambient disease prevalence rate. Let qi(bi , b- i , θ) denote 
the output produced by producer i, where bi and b- i  are 
respectively the biosecurity inputs for producer i and 
the rest of producers, and θ∈[0, 1] stands for an ambient 
disease prevalence rate. Ii(qi , q- i ) is government’s 
indemnity to agent i when the output pair is (qi , q- i ) and 
w represents the unit cost of biosecurity input. The joint 
probability density that the output level (q1, q2) is 
realized given the biosecurity input level (b1, b2) is ƒ(q1, 
q2⎟ b1, b2 ). Producer i’s utility function can be denoted 
as U{qi, Ii(qi , q- i ), bi} = V{qi , Ii(qi , q- i )} – biw. Assume the 
producers’ reservation profit is U. 
Here, the objective of the government is to choose a pair 
of indemnity payment functions {I1(q1, q2 ), I2(q1, q2 )}to 
minimize its expected indemnity payment, subject to 
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satisfies participation constraint and nash incentive 
compatibility constraint:
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